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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1923 
___________ 
 
YASSIN HAYTHAME MOHAMAD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BARRY SMITH, Lieutenant in his own capacity; STEPHEN BEST, 
Correctional Officer in his own capacity;  
ROBERT DICK, Correctional Officer 1 in his own capacity; THOMAS 
BOGARDUS, Sergeant in his own capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00943) 
District Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 9, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: August 16, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Yassin Haythame Mohamad appeals the District Court’s order 
granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Because this appeal is legally 
meritless, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   
I. 
 In November 2009, Mohamad, then an inmate at State Correctional Institution 
(“SCI”) at Forest and now at SCI-Graterford, filed a complaint against prison personnel 
alleging violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as his 
rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et. seq.  Mohamad alleged that, in attempting to take his photograph for 
his prison identification in December 2007, defendants treated him roughly and took his 
kufi in violation of his rights.  In a later filing he requested injunctive relief in the form of 
his removal from SCI-Forest on account of perceived threats against him from prison 
personnel.   
 Defendants moved for summary judgment and showed the following.  Defendant 
Smith was supervising Defendants Best and Bogardus as they escorted Mohamad from 
the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) so that he could be photographed.  Defendant Dick 
was responsible for recording the events on video, in conformance with the movement 
restrictions imposed on Mohamad as a result of his history of assaultive behavior.  
Pursuant to Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy that no head gear be worn in 
inmate identification photographs, Smith removed Mohamad’s kufi, at which point 
Mohamad repeatedly stated that he would not allow his photograph to be taken and 
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bowed and turned his head.  Smith and Best consequently became concerned that 
Mohamad would spit on them, because pursuant to the movement restrictions a spit 
shield was normally required when Mohamad had contact with guards, but he was not 
wearing it for the photograph.  Best attempted to restrain Mohamad’s head in an effort to 
shield himself and to allow the photograph to be taken.  Mohamad continued to turn his 
head.  Defendants asserted that Mohamad then pushed back into Best, knocking him off 
balance, and Best attested that he felt Mohamad’s hands trying to grab him.  At that point 
defendants brought Mohamad to the floor.  When he was brought under control, he was 
brought to his feet and the spit shield was placed on him; he was then escorted back to the 
RHU.  A medical assessment conducted immediately after the incident shows Mohamad 
received no injury and needed no treatment.  The District Court granted defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment because Mohamad had not filed a response indicating that 
there was a genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to any of his claims.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of orders granting 
summary judgment is plenary.  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 
F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the denial of injunctive relief for abuse of 
discretion but we review underlying factual findings for clear error, and our review of 
legal conclusions is plenary.  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-
Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because Mohamad is proceeding in forma 
pauperis, we must dismiss the appeal if it is entirely without legal merit.  28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B).   
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 A party moving for summary judgment must show that there exists no real issue as 
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  On appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Brown v. 
Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002), but the party opposing summary judgment 
“may not rest upon . . . mere allegations.”  Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 
(3d Cir. 2001).  We agree with the District Court that defendants showed that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to any of Mohamad’s claims against 
them. 
III. 
 The standard to evaluate whether prison authorities’ use of force is cruel and 
unusual is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”  Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 
1, 6-7 (1992).  The factors a court must consider to determine this are (1) the need to 
apply force; (2) the relationship between the need and amount of force used; (3) the 
degree of injury meted out; (4) the extent of the threat to the staff and inmate safety, as 
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials based on subjectively known facts; and 
(5) any efforts made to mitigate the severity of a forceful response.  Giles v. Kearney, 
571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009).  The District Court scrupulously applied these factors 
and determined that defendants showed, through a variety of evidence including 
misconduct records and digital video recordings of his behavior, that Mohamad had a 
history of threatening and assaultive behavior, and that on the occasion in question he 
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repeatedly resisted attempts to take his photograph and apparently physically backed in to 
one of the defendants.  Mohamad offered no evidence suggesting defendants willfully 
plotted to use, or in fact used, any more force than was necessary or used force 
maliciously and sadistically.
1
  Indeed, he even admitted that he had been resisting and 
that he told medical personnel immediately after the incident that he was “okay,” and his 
filings include the results of an investigation finding that the unplanned use of force was 
in no way excessive.
2
  Mohamad provided no basis for contesting the defendants’ 
contention that they placed him on the floor to defuse an escalating situation in a good-
faith effort to restore discipline. 
 Mohamad did little to explain his First Amendment claim, but the District Court 
reasonably construed it as a Free Exercise claim.
3
  The District Court was likewise 
correct in its conclusion that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity concerning this 
claim.  The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from liability for 
civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not infringe what a reasonable person 
would have known was a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.  Sharp v. 
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).  Defendant Smith showed that he acted 
pursuant to a DOC policy requiring that all head gear be removed when inmate 
identification photographs are taken; Mohamad could not remove it himself because he 
                                              
1
 In his Concise Statement of Material Facts, Mohamad does offer Exhibit L, an unsworn 
declaration by fellow inmate Gary Banks, but this declaration merely describes the 
guards’ handling Mohamad in conformance with his movement restrictions.  
2
 Exhibit K in Mohamad’s Concise Statement of Material Facts.  
3
 Mohamad’s appellate brief confirms that it is indeed a Free Exercise claim. 
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was restrained.  Mohamad presented no evidence that Smith violated any protocol or any 
clearly established right by removing his kufi so that his photograph could be taken.   
 We also agree with the District Court that Mohamad cannot maintain a RLUIPA 
action for money damages against defendants in either their individual or official 
capacities, and that any claim for injunctive relief is moot.
4
  The statute does not permit 
actions against state officials in their individual capacities.  Sharp, 669 F.3d at 153.  
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for money damages against state 
officials acting in their official capacities absent the state’s consent or Congressional 
abrogation.  Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).  In accepting federal 
funding, states do not waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages 
under RLUIPA.  Sossamon v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011).  
Sovereign immunity thus bars Mohamad’s claims for damages against defendants in their 
official capacities.   
 Furthermore, his claims for injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer an 
inmate at SCI-Forest and thus no longer interacts with the personnel he claimed were 
threatening him.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (transfer from 
the prison complained of generally moots equitable claims).    
 Mohamad did little to explain his Fourteenth Amendment claim, but the District 
Court reasonably construed it as an Equal Protection claim.
5
  The District Court was 
likewise correct in its conclusion that defendants did not treat Mohamad differently from 
                                              
4
 Mohamad’s appellate brief “concedes to the Magistrate[’]s findings with regard to his 
RLUIPA claims.” 
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those similarly situated.  City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985).  Defendants showed that it was DOC policy that all head gear be removed for 
inmate identification photographs, and Mohamad provided nothing to show that others 
were permitted to wear head gear for their identification photographs.   
IV. 
 Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for want of legal merit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
5
 Mohamad’s appellate brief confirms that it is indeed an Equal Protection claim. 
